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Abstract In early 2018, the tortuous process towards the establishment of a frame-
work for collective redress at the EU level reached new milestones. In January, the
European Commission published its long-awaited report assessing the practical im-
plementation of the 2013 Recommendation. As many had predicted, the Recommen-
dation has failed to secure a consistent and coherent framework for collective redress
in the EU and national legal landscapes remain highly fragmented. In April, the Com-
mission presented new measures supporting collective redress for consumers in the
context of its ‘New deal for consumers’. In particular, a new draft Directive intends
to maximise the potential of injunctions orders to facilitate redress in mass harm situ-
ations. The question is now whether the proposed instrument is likely to successfully
put an end to the collective redress conundrum and to provide an effective tool for
resolving mass claims in the EU.
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In early 2018, the tortuous process towards the establishment of a framework for
collective redress at the EU level reached new milestones. In January, the European
Commission published its long-awaited report on the practical implementation of
the 2013 Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and compensatory
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collective redress mechanisms (hereinafter, the ‘evaluation report’).1 As many had
predicted, the Recommendation has failed to secure a consistent and coherent frame-
work for collective redress in the EU and national legal landscapes remain highly
fragmented. Nine Member States still do not provide for any compensatory collective
redress mechanism. In the Member States where collective redress mechanisms are
available, they tend to vary greatly and are not sufficiently effective. In the meantime,
mass harm situations have multiplied. The cars’ emissions scandal (‘Dieselgate’) in
2015 or Ryanair’s massive flights cancellation in September 2017 are among many
examples of mass damage affecting hundreds of individuals across the EU. In this
context, the Commission seemed caught between a rock and a hard place. On the
one hand, the issue of collective redress continues to be sensitive across the EU and
still divides Member States. A regulation setting down a horizontal compensatory
collective redress mechanism with detailed procedural rules was unrealistic. This
would be perceived as disproportionate and as going against the legal traditions of
Member States. On the other hand, the Commission was urged to take actions as the
ever-increasing digitalisation and globalisation of good and services in various eco-
nomic sectors have multiplied the risks of mass harm while tools for compensating
consumers in such situations are often still lacking. It appears for example that Eu-
ropean consumers affected by the Dieselgate scandal received lower compensation
than US consumers and were compensated less quickly.2 In April 2017, the Euro-
pean Parliament called for ‘a legislative proposal for the establishment of a collective
redress mechanism in order to create a harmonised system for EU consumers, thus
eliminating the current situation in which consumers lack protection in most Mem-
ber States’.3 In October 2017, thirty-eight Members of the European Parliament and
the European Consumer Association (BEUC) wrote to President Juncker and Justice
Commissioner Jourová asking for measures to compensate individuals involved in
mass harm situations.4
In April 2018, the Commission finally presented a legislative package entitled
‘a New deal for consumers’ with new measures supporting collective redress for con-
sumers. Among other things, the legislative proposal includes a draft Directive mod-
ernising the framework for injunctions orders and introducing a new instrument en-
hancing redress for consumers in mass harm situations. The question is now whether
the proposed instrument is likely to successfully put an end to the collective redress
conundrum and to provide an effective tool for resolving mass claims in the EU.
1EU Commission, Report on the implementation of the Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on
common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States
concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law, COM(2018) 40 final, 25 January 2018, available
at www.ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=49502.
2Euractiv, ‘EU clear path for collective law suits’, 11 April 2018, available at: www.euractiv.com/section/
eu-priorities-2020/news/eu-clears-path-for-collective-law-suits/.
3EU Parliament, Recommendation following the inquiry into emission measurements in the automotive
sector, P8-TA (2017)0100, 4 April 2017, para. 59, available at www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?
pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2017-0100+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
4European Consumer Association, Letter sent to President Juncker and Commissioner Jourova ‘Time
for the European Commission to legislate on Collective Redress’, 10 October 2017, available at www.
beuc.eu/publications/beuc-x-2017-107_time_for_the_european_commission_to_legislate_on_collective_
redress.pdf.
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This article reviews the failure of the 2013 Recommendation (Sect. 1) and discusses
follow-up EU initiatives in the context of the New deal for consumers. Ultimately, it
appears that the new instrument contains some interesting evolutions that are likely
to improve consumers’ access to justice, but it also fails to fully address some key
issues that could contribute to an effective resolution of mass claims (Sect. 2).
1 The predictable failure of the 2013 Recommendation
It is essential to keep in mind the highly complex policy process that led to the 2013
Recommendation. This document was first and foremost a political one, shaped by
pressure and intensive lobbying from the industry,5 disagreements between Member
States, and compromises within the European Commission. From the very beginning,
the Recommendation met with fairly limited enthusiasm (Sect. 1.1). At the time of
its assessment, many of these early criticisms had indeed materialised (Sect. 1.2).
1.1 2013: early criticisms and missed opportunities
In 2011, after years of patchy initiatives within the Commission that resulted in sev-
eral studies and policy papers,6 President Barroso asked his Commissioners in charge
of Competition, Consumer Affairs and Justice to address the issue of collective re-
dress jointly and coherently. In a collaboration note of 2010, the three Commissioners
announced the launch of a public consultation on a ‘European approach to collective
redress in order to identify which forms of collective redress could fit into the EU le-
gal system and into the legal orders of Member States. 7 The consultation took place
in 2011 and met with a considerable response. The Commission received 310 replies
from stakeholders and organised public hearings attended by 300 individuals.8 In
2012, the European Parliament decided to take part in the debate and adopted a res-
olution based on a report conducted on its own initiative. It urged the Commission
to adopt a horizontal approach to collective redress, ‘specifically but not exclusively
dealing with the infringement of consumer’ rights’ so as to avoid further fragmenta-
tion and uncoordinated EU actions.9
In 2013, the process resulted in a package of three documents: a Communica-
tion in which the Commission explained its philosophy and approach to collective
5Gross [5].
6Among others: EU Commission, Green paper on consumer collective redress, COM(2008)794 Final,
27 November 2008; White paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, SEC(2008)405,
2 April 2008; Civic Consulting & Oxford Economics, Study on the effectiveness and efficiency of collective
mechanisms in the European Union, SANCO/2007/B4/004, 2007.
7EU Commission, Joint information note ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective re-
dress: next steps, SEC(2010)1192, 5 October 2010, available at: ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/
actionsdamages/Commission_2010_information_towards_european_collective_redress.pdf.
8EU Commission, ‘Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress’, COM (2013) 401
Final, 11 June 2013 (hereafter, ‘2013 Communication on collective redress’), at p. 5 and 6.
9EU Parliament, Towards a coherent European approach to collective redress, 2 February 2012, para. 15,
available at www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2012-0012+
0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
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redress,10 a Recommendation listing eleven non-binding criteria that should guide
Member States when designing their respective national legislations on collective
redress,11 and a draft Directive on damages for breach of EU Competition law.12
Regarded as ‘a light at the end of the tunnel’13 or as ‘an important step for the fu-
ture of EU collective redress’,14 the Recommendation pursued several objectives.
First, taking into account existing divergences across Member States, it did not seek
harmonisation but intended to promote general principles bringing some coherence
and consistency between national collective redress mechanisms. Second, navigating
competing political considerations, it aimed to promote a balanced framework ensur-
ing both effective access to justice for individuals involved in mass harm situations
while establishing sufficient safeguards to avoid abusive litigation. It is commonplace
to say that the Commission viewed the US class action experience and its ‘toxic cock-
tail’15 as a counter-model for the EU. Conversely, it aimed at encouraging a European
approach to collective redress taking into account the different legal traditions of the
Member States. Third and finally, the Recommendation intended to serve as a starting
point for discussions in Member States with the intent to trigger some law-making.
Soon after its publication, the Recommendation faced limited enthusiasm among
stakeholders. The European Consumer Association for instance regretted the Com-
mission’s ‘baby steps’ and considered that it ‘ha[d] dragged its feet on this burning
issue’.16 Businesses also reacted negatively,17 even though some viewed the use of a
non-binding instrument as ‘a least bad approach to collective redress’.18 More wor-
ryingly, observers enumerated several shortcomings likely to undermine the overall
coherence of the European initiative. First, inconsistent approaches across Member
States were likely to subsist due to the absence of a binding instrument. The Rec-
ommendation indeed provided Member States with guidance on collective redress
but did not require them to take actions. The latter remained free to introduce such
mechanisms in their legislations but also free to decide whether the mechanism had
to be available horizontally or only in specific sectors. Hence, as some anticipated,
‘whether and what steps are taken remains a matter for the Member States and, as
102013 Communication on collective redress.
11EU Commission, Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective
redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union law,
2013/396/EU, 11 June 2013 (hereafter, ‘2013 Recommendation on collective redress).
12Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain
rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions
of the Member States and of the European Union.
13Voet [16].
14Kramer [8], p. 236.
15EU Commission, Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress—Questions and Answers,
MEMO/08/741, 27 November 2008; see also: 2013 Communication on collective redress at p. 8.
16European Consumer Association, ‘EU takes baby step towards collective consumer court actions’,
PR2013/10, June 2013, available at: www.beuc.eu/publications/2013-00408-01-e.pdf.
17UEAPME, ‘SMEs say no to collective redress, but react positively on antitrust damage proposal’, 12 June
2013, available at: www.ueapme.com/IMG/pdf/130612_pr_Collective_redress.pdf.
18Eurochambres, ‘Last bad approach on collective redress’, 11 June 2013, available at www.eurochambres.
eu/objects/1/Files/EUROCHAMBRES_PR-Approach_collective_redress.pdf.
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such, may produce the situation where little reform has taken place by 2017’.19 Back
in 2013, the Commission knew that a binding proposal would have faced consider-
able political resistance and probably been barred by the Council and the Member
States. Given the short period of time left before the end of the Barroso II Commis-
sion, a non-binding proposal appeared as the only realistic—albeit unsatisfactory—
option.20 Second, heterogeneity across national collective redress mechanisms was
also likely to persist due to the flexibility of the principles laid down in the Recom-
mendation.21 The definition of a coherent and consistent framework appeared indeed
plagued by several exemptions allowing Member States to ultimately depart from the
Recommendation. For example, the Recommendation supported the use of the opt in
system, but also admitted exceptions and the use of opt out when justified ‘by reasons
of sound administration of justice’, which was rather a fuzzy exception leaving Mem-
ber States free to follow alternative approaches.22 Furthermore, even though Member
States were recommended to not permit contingency fees, the Recommendation still
admitted their use, if regulated. Finally, as some scholars observed in 2014, ‘what is
claimed to be a solid statement of safeguards turns out on closer inspections to be
a flaky, permeable and porous wall, with little stability’23 and the Recommendation
ultimately appeared as ‘a disappointing turnaround establishing a feeble and emas-
culated scheme’.24 In parallel, the document was also criticised for its lack of clarity
and guidance on several key issues. It was for instance inconclusive on the applica-
tion of private international rules to cross border cases and did not provide sufficient
clarifications on issues relating to international jurisdiction, recognition and enforce-
ment, which are yet cornerstone for the resolution of cross border cases. In 2013,
many stakeholders had requested additional clarifications on the application of juris-
dictional rules. However, views differed too widely on the matter and no agreement
could be found. Consequently, the Commission took the view that existing rules laid
down in the Brussels I Regulation25 (now Brussels I bis Regulation)26 ‘should be
fully exploited’,27 even though Brussels I had obviously not been tailored to address
mass claims. Uncertainties thus remained regarding its application in such peculiar
circumstances.28
Member States were given until June 2015 to implement the principles laid down
in the Recommendation. Yet follow-up studies quickly showed that many of the an-
ticipated concerns had materialised. In particular, a joint research project conducted
19Sorabji [13], p. 67, Tzakas [15].
20Stadler [14].
21Benöhr [2].
22Silvestri [12], p. 53.
23Hodges [6], p. 79, Hodges [7].
24Nagy [10], p. 532.
25Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L 12/1.
26Regulation EU No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2012 on
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2012] OJ
L 351/1.
272013 Communication on collective redress, p. 13.
28Kramer [8], p. 247.
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by the Universities of Leuven and Oxford in 2016 that built on national reports and
case studies pointed out that ‘almost without exception, class action mechanisms take
time, involve cost (which can act as a significant barrier to claimants and those who
wish to initiate an action), reduce sums paid to the claimants through funders’ costs,
and deliver limited outcomes’.29 It further pointed out that ‘each national system is
tailored to domestic needs, often uninfluenced by the Commission’s blueprint, and
the overview is of piecemeal development which is uncontrolled’.30 In this context,
the evaluation report, which was expected for the end of 2017, left little room for
optimism.
1.2 2017: evaluation time
The Commission committed to review the practical implementation of its Recom-
mendation four years after its publication and to assess whether further legislative
measures were necessary to consolidate the horizontal approach. Postponed several
times, the report was finally published in January 2018. One important question re-
gards the benchmark against which the Recommendation had to be assessed. The
criteria set out by the Commission were ‘the impact on access to justice, the right to
obtain compensation, the need to prevent abusive litigation, the impact on the func-
tioning of the single market, the economy of the EU and consumer trust’.31 The
evaluation report was based on several sources of information, including responses
of Member States to a questionnaire sent by the Commission, replies of stakehold-
ers to a ‘call for evidence’ that took place between April and August 2017,32 and a
very extensive and detailed study conducted by a consortium of external consultants
analysing collective redress mechanisms in all Member States.33 It also built on the
findings of the 2017 Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law as regards
the use of injunction procedures in the EU.34 Strikingly, the number of responses
(61) to the call for evidence appeared quite small compared the number of responses
collected during the 2013 public consultation. In addition—and unsurprisingly for
such a controversial matter—contributions from stakeholders turned out to be highly
polarised. The European Consumer Association for instance highlighted that ‘it is
clear that the Recommendation did not produce necessary results for access to justice
and compensation in mass harm situations in Europe. Huge gaps continue to exist
29Voet/Hodges [20], p. 3.
30Voet/Hodges [20], p. 7.
312013 Recommendation on collective redress, para. 41.
32EU Commission, ‘Call for evidence on the operation of collective redress arrangements in the Member
States of the European Union’, 22 May 2017, available at www.ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.
cfm?item_id=59539.
33
‘State of collective redress in the EU in the context of the implementation of the Commission Recom-
mendation’, JUST/2016/JCOO/FW/CIVI/0099, study prepared by the British Institute of International and
Comparative Law, Civic Consulting and RPA, November 2017 (available at: www.ec.europa.eu/newsroom/
just/document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=50236).
34EU Commission, Fitness check of consumer and marketing law and of the evaluation of the Consumer
Rights Directive, SWD(2017)209 Final, 23 May 2017, www.ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?
item_id=59332 (hereafter, ‘2017 Fitness check’).
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(. . . )’.35 Representing the US Chamber of Commerce, the Institute for Legal Reform
argued that ‘there are a number of very powerful indicator that all of the same incen-
tives and forces that have led to mass abuses in other jurisdictions are also gathering
force in the EU’ and added that ‘there are already worrying signs that some Member
States are allowing relatively unsafeguarded mechanism to develop’.36
The report noted the persistent diversity of collective redress mechanisms across
the EU.37 Nine Member States have no compensatory collective redress. Seven of
them have enacted reforms, which have not always complied with the principles laid
down in the Recommendation. Where they are available, national collective redress
mechanisms differ significantly with regard to their scope (some Member States have
collective redress mechanisms available horizontally, while others rely on sector-
specific mechanisms), standing (most of the time, representative entities such as as-
sociations have standing, but some Member States have also imposed some stringent
rules requiring representative entities to demonstrate sufficient expertise or experi-
ence), or use of the opt in system (thirteen Member States exclusively apply the opt-
in principle, four apply both opt in and opt out depending on the type of actions and
specificities of the case, and two exclusively rely on the opt out).38 As several scholars
highlighted, these disparities can be explained by the weight of national political re-
alities, domestic policy-making and divergent legal traditions, which ultimately have
profoundly influenced the shape and design of collective redress mechanisms across
the EU.39 Finally, the effectiveness of collective redress mechanisms, where they ex-
ist, seemed quite limited as ‘in practice affected persons do not use them due to the
rigid conditions set out in national legislation, the lengthy nature of procedures or
perceived excessive costs in relation to the expected benefits of such actions’.40
In parallel, the Commission also noted several growing concerns. One of them
notably regards the funding of collective actions and the increasing role played by
third-party funding, which is an emerging phenomenon in Europe41 with potential
long-lasting implications for collective litigation. The Recommendation did not pro-
hibit third-party funding but recommended some forms of regulation to avoid con-
flicts of interest, excessive interest rates or economic incentives potentially leading to
abusive litigation. Yet, as the Commission observed ‘this is one of the points where
the Recommendation had almost no impact in the laws of the Member States (. . . ).
This general lack of implementation means that unregulated and uncontrolled third-
35European Consumer Association, ‘European Collective Redress—What is the EU waiting for?’, July
2017, available at www.beuc.eu/publications/beuc-x-2017-086_ama_european_collective_redress.pdf.
36Institute for Legal Reform, ‘The Growth of Collective Redress in the EU—A Survey of Developments
in 10 Member States’, March. 2017, available at: www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/The_
Growth_of_Collective_Redress_in_the_EU_A_Survey_of_Developments_in_10_Member_States_April_
2017.pdf.
37Evaluation report, p. 3.
38Evaluation report, p. 13.
39Mulheron [9], Voet [17], Voet [18].
40Evaluation report, p. 20. For a national illustration, see for instance Biard [3].
41For example, third party litigation funding is still in its infancy and debated in France. See (inter alia):
Ancelin/De Causans [1].
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party financing can proliferate without legal constraints, creating potential incentives
for litigation in certain Member States’.42
Since the Recommendation did not touch upon the question of jurisdictional rules
for cross-border mass cases, the evaluation report was also silent on this topic un-
fortunately. However, it pointed out several issues directly connected to the appli-
cation of jurisdictional rules, such as the introduction of different collective redress
proceedings in four different Member States in the context of the Dieselgate with
inherent risks that ‘these pending cases [may] lead to different results depending on
the Member States where judgements will be rendered’, risks of forum shopping or
double compensation. After the Recommendation,43 the evaluation report is there-
fore another missed opportunity to start discussions on the application of private
international rules to cross border cases. Coincidentally, on the very same date of
the publication of the evaluation report, the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) handed down a decision in which it had the possibility to bring some clarity
on the application of private international law rules in cross border mass cases.44 One
of the questions referred to the Court dealt with international jurisdiction rules for
disputes concerning consumer contracts where claims have been assigned. Yet the
Court dismissed an attempt to bring a class action on behalf of 25,000 consumers be-
fore Austrian courts. As the Advocate General pointed out, ‘Regulation No 44/2001
does not provide specific provisions on the assignment of claims or procedures for
collective redress. This (presumed or real) lacuna has long been debated by the legal
scholarship, which has expressed the view that the regulation is an insufficient ba-
sis for cross-border EU collective actions. The application of the consumer forum in
cases of collective action is the object of heated debate’.45
At the end of the journey, the Recommendation has certainly been a useful brain-
storming exercise and, as the Commission highlighted, constituted a starting point
for discussions across the EU ‘on how some principles (. . . ) may best be imple-
mented to guarantee the overall balance between the access to justice and prevention
of abuses’.46 Although important, these achievements seem however quite limited
compared to initial expectations, which, back in 2013, targeted the development of a
coherent and consistent framework for collective redress in the EU.
2 The New deal for consumers and the revival of collective redress
The European Commission announced several actions to follow up on its evalua-
tion report. Consumer protection was a field where measures could be expected.
As the evaluation report highlights, ‘whilst the Recommendation has a horizontal
42Evaluation report, p. 5.
43Stadler [14], Kramer [8].
44Case C-498/16 Schrems v Facebook Ireland Ltd, EU:C:2018:37.
45Opinion of Advocate General Bobek in Case C-498/16 Schrems v Facebook Ireland Ltd, 14 November
2016, EU:C:2017:863, para. 121.
46Evaluation report, p. 19.
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dimension given the different areas in which mass harm may occur, the concrete
cases reported, including the car emissions case, clearly demonstrate that the areas
of the EU law relevant for collective interests of consumers are those in which col-
lective redress is most often made available, in which actions are most often brought
and in which the absence of collective remedies is of biggest practical relevance’.47
The ‘New deal for consumers’ package presented on 11 April 2018 intends to intro-
duce a new instrument supporting collective redress for consumers in the context of
a revision of the 2009 Injunctions Directive (Sect. 2.1). It now remains to be seen
whether the new proposed instrument will be an effective tool for resolving mass
claims (Sect. 2.2).
2.1 The New deal for consumers: a new instrument for collective redress
On 13 September 2017, in the aftermath of the Dieselgate scandal, Commission Pres-
ident Juncker announced a ‘New deal for consumers’ to promote fairer and more ef-
ficient rules for consumers. Back then, the new package was presented as an attempt
for ‘stepping up the enforcement of EU law in a holistic way and securing more
effective consumer redress in mass harm situations’.48 The package was officially
published on 11 April 2018.49 It builds on the findings of the Fitness Check of EU
Consumer and Marketing law of May 2017, the evaluation of the 2011 Consumer
Rights Directive, 50 and the report on collective redress of January 2018. It also takes
into account the revision of the Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) Regulation
of December 2017,51 and the Directive on consumer Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR).52 The package includes a Communication from the Commission detailing
its action plan53 and two legislative instruments. A new proposal for a Directive on
representative actions for the protection of collective interests of consumers aims to
facilitate redress for consumers in mass harm situations.54 Its inception Impact As-
sessment was opened for public consultation between October and November 2017
47Evaluation report, p. 20.
48EU Commission, New deal for Consumers—Inception Impact assessment, September 2017, available at
www.ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-2017-5324969_en (hereafter, ‘Inception Im-
pact Assessment’).
49EU Commission, Work Programme 2017, at p. 7 available at www.ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/
cwp_2018_en.pdf.
502017 Fitness check.
51EU Regulation 2017/2394 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 December 2017 on
cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws and
repealing Regulation No 2006/2004 [2017] OJ L 345/1 (‘CPC Regulation’).
52Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative
dispute resolution for consumer disputes [2013] OJ L 165/63.
53Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee, A New Deal for Consumers, COM (2018) 183/3, April 2018.
54Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on representative actions for the
protection of the collective interests of consumers, and repealing Directive 2009/22/EC, COM (2018)
184/3.
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and received twenty-four replies.55 In parallel, a proposal for a Directive as regards
better enforcement and modernisation of EU consumer protection rules intends to in-
troduce several targeted amendments to substantive consumer rules laid down in four
different directives56 that were considered by the Commission as ‘overall still fit for
purpose (. . . ) including in the digital and online markets’.57
The 2017 Fitness Check identified several shortcomings in the Injunctions Di-
rective,58 namely the length and costs of the procedure, its limited enforcement and
the absence of compensatory effects for consumers.59 The objective of the draft Di-
rective is thus twofold: it strengthens the framework for injunction procedures and
includes an instrument for compensating consumers in mass harm situations. Under
the new proposed rules, non-profit qualified entities, such as consumer associations
or independent public bodies, can bring representative actions to seek measures that
include ‘an injunction order as an interim measure, an injunction order establishing
an infringement and measures aimed at the elimination of the continuing effects of
the infringements, including redress orders’. Those entities will be allowed to seek
the above measures within a single representative action’.60 Member States will be
free to decide whether the procedure will be a judicial or administrative one, or both.
In order to better understand the functioning of the proposed instrument, it might
be useful to consider the way the European Commission initially sketched it in its
inception impact assessment:
‘(. . . ) a single procedure (“one stop shop”) in which qualified entities could si-
multaneously ask the courts and/or administrative authority to stop the breach
and ensure redress for the victims. In such scenario, the court/administrative
authority would be able to issue, next to the injunction order, a direct redress
order or to invite the infringing trader and the qualified entity to enter into
out-of-court redress negotiations (. . . ). If the negotiations lead to an amicable
settlement, the court/administrative authority would check the fairness of the
settlement and approve it in order for it to become enforceable. However, if the
negotiations were unsuccessful, that court/administrative authority would con-
tinue the proceeding in view of providing consumer redress according to rules
defined by Member States’.61
55Inception Impact Assessment (received feedbacks are available at www.ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-
regulation/initiatives/ares-2017-5324969/feedback_en).
56Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive
93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993, Directive 98/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Directive
2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Directive 2011/83/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council as regards better enforcement and modernisation of EU consumer protection
rules, COM (2018) 185/3.
572017 Fitness check, p. 76.
58Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on injunctions
for the protection of consumers’ interests.
592017 Fitness check, p. 102.
60Explanatory Memorandum accompanying a Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the
Council on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers, and repealing
Directive 2009/22/EC, COM(2018)184/3, p. 14.
61Inception Impact Assessment, p. 4.
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2.2 An effective instrument for the resolution of mass claims? Some
preliminary remarks
The publication of the New deal for consumers package triggered many diverse re-
actions. From the consumers’ side, the new instrument was overall well-received and
perceived as an improvement, although several problems continue to exist. The Euro-
pean Consumer Association for instance views it as ‘only a first step but not a fully-
fledged collective redress scheme across the EU’. In particular, it feared that ‘Member
States will be given too much discretion to decide which cases are fit for a collective
redress procedure and which are not’.62 Conversely, business representatives were
much more critical and vehemently rejected the proposed mechanism63 described as
‘an example of needless overshooting’,64 as ‘unbalanced in favour of consumers’ and
‘missing the necessary safeguards‘.65 The Director of EDiMA, the trade organisation
representing the interests of large internet companies such as Google, Ebay, Face-
book or Amazon argued that the proposal ‘lack[s] robust procedural guarantees that
prevent opportunist litigation and meritless claims similar to the US experience with
class action’.66 The European Commission has insisted on the fact that the ‘EU repre-
sentative actions will be different from the US style class action’. As stated upfront in
Article 1, the Directive seeks to preserve the collective interests of consumers while
ensuring appropriate safeguards to avoid abusive litigation. Only qualified indepen-
dent entities, such as consumer organisations or independent public bodies, comply-
ing with strict criteria will be able to initiate the actions. As Commissioner Jourova
said during the official presentation of the new package, ‘representative actions in
the European way will bring more fairness to consumers, not more business for law
firms’.67 Those qualified entities will be subject to transparency requirements with
an obligation to disclose the origins of the funds used for their activities in general
and the funds used to support the action in particular.68 As a follow-up on the ob-
servations made in the evaluation report of January, the draft Directive also includes
rules enhancing transparency on third-party funding. An important question though
62BEUC, “New deal for consumers”—clear improvement but not the needed quantum leap’,
11 April 2018 (available at: http://www.beuc.eu/publications/%E2%80%98new-deal-consumers%E2%
80%99-%E2%80%93-clear-improvement-not-needed-quantum-leap/html).
63VN, ‘Neuer EU-Deal für Konsumenten in der Kritik’, 12 April 2018 (available at: www.vn.at/markt/
2018/04/11/neuer-eu-deal-fuer-konsumenten-in-der-kritik.vn); MEDEF, ‘Nouvelles de Bruxelles’,
11 April 2018 (available at: www.medef.com/fr/actualites/nouvelles-de-bruxelles-49).
64Eurochambres, ‘The New deal for consumers or how to open the door for abuses: an example of needless
overshooting’, 11 April 2018 (available at www.eurochambres.eu/content/default.asp?PageID=1&DocID=
7850).
65UEAPME, ‘New deal for consumers: missed chance for SME-friendly law’, 11 April 2018 (available at:
ueapme.com/IMG/pdf/180411_-_pr_New_Deal_for_Consumers.pdf).
66EDiMA, ‘EDiMA’s reaction to the Commission’s New deal for consumers’, 11 April 2018 (available at:
www.edima-eu.org/news/edimas-reaction-to-the-commissions-new-deal-for-consumers/).
67Euractiv, ‘EU clear path for collective law suits’, 11 April 2018 (available at: www.euractiv.com/
section/eu-priorities-2020/news/eu-clears-path-for-collective-law-suits/).
68Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on representative actions for the
protection of the collective interests of consumers, and repealing Directive 2009/22/EC, COM(2018)184/3,
Art. 7.
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regards the connection existing between the 2013 recommendation and the rules set
down in the proposed directive. The proposal does not reproduce the principles of
the 2013 Recommendation in their entirety as ‘it only regulates certain key aspects
that are necessary for the establishment of a framework (. . . )’.69 Yet, for the sake
of visibility and consistency, it would certainly have been preferable to have a con-
tinuity between the two texts, with the new proposal ultimately fully duplicating the
principles laid down in the 2013 Recommendation.
Interestingly, the new instrument includes several tools that support the action of
qualified entities. This evolution should be welcomed as past experience has showed
that limited resources of representative entities often prevented them from initiating
mass claims. Among other things, Article 15 of the draft Directive entitled ‘assis-
tance for qualified entities’ now provides that Member States shall take the necessary
measures to ensure that procedural costs related to representative actions do not con-
stitute financial obstacles for qualified entities, such as limiting applicable court or
administrative fees, granting them access to legal aid where necessary, or by provid-
ing them with public funding for this purpose.’ Obviously, the type of measures that
subsequently will be introduced by Member States in this respect will need to be
carefully scrutinised and assessed. The proposal also seeks to alleviate the burden of
proof of qualified entities and to facilitate their access to evidence by allowing them
to request from the court an order requesting the defendant to provide evidence lying
in its control.70
Importantly, the success of the proposed mechanism will be highly dependent on
the good articulation between the injunction order and the redress mechanism. In this
view, the draft Directive appears to clearly encourage the use of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) mechanisms to resolve mass claims.71 This does not come as a sur-
prise given the interest of the Commission in ADR in general and for the resolution of
mass claims, in particular. The evaluation report of January 2018 already highlighted
that ‘introducing such schemes in collective redress mechanisms is an efficient way
of dealing with mass harm situations, with potential positive effects on the length of
the proceedings and on the costs for parties and judicial systems’, whereas the call
for evidence conducted with stakeholders in parallel revealed ‘an important trend in
relation to collective out-of-court dispute resolution’.72 However, as scholars pointed
out, ‘a theory that defendants who are found to have infringed trading law would then
typically avoid mass damages claims by settling them has not been established to be
valid in practice. Indeed, there is empirical evidence that cases of this type have not
been swiftly settled’.73
Provided that parties agree to settle, the fairness and legality of the settlement
agreement will have to be reviewed by a court or an administrative authority. This
69European Commission, Explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposal for a directive on rep-
resentative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers, and repealing Directive
2009/22/EC, COM(2018) 184/3.
70Idem, Art. 13.
71Idem, Art. 8.
72Evaluation report, pp. 14–15.
73Voet/Hodges [19], p. 5.
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task will be essential to preserve the right and interest of all parties but is also likely
to be particularly complicated. It may thus be useful to develop Best Practices and
guidance for judges and authorities listing key issues requiring specific attention
during the review of settlement agreements. This is the path that has for instance
been followed by the US Federal Judicial Centre with the publication of a ‘pocket
guide’ assisting judges when reviewing mass settlements. The guidelines list several
‘hot button indicators’ highlighting potential risks of unfair settlements.74 Obviously,
these documents have been designed in the US context and should be adapted to the
EU framework. However, the underlying problem remains the same as the court/the
authority must in both cases protect the interests of all represented and absent parties.
Moreover, the proposal includes some rules for facilitating cross-border repre-
sentative actions, in particular the mutual recognition of the legal standing of enti-
ties designated in different Member States and the possibility for entities from sev-
eral Member States to act jointly within a single procedure in front of a single fo-
rum.75 However, the draft Directive once again fails to clearly solve the issue of
private international law rules applicable for the resolution of mass cases, in partic-
ular rules concerning jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgements and
applicable law.76 In the context of a multiplication of cross border mass harm situ-
ations, this comes as a major disappointment. Advocate General on previously-cited
case C-498/16 of 25 January 2018 indirectly called for clarifications from the policy-
maker on this aspect when highlighting that ‘the issue is too delicate and complex. It
is in need of comprehensive legislation, not an isolated judicial intervention within a
related but somewhat remote legislative instrument that is clearly unfit for that pur-
pose’.77 Discussions seem now to be postponed to the publication of a report on the
application of the Brussels I Regulation, which will review experience with cross-
border mass cases.78 However, this report is only due in 2022, whereas the applica-
tion of private international law in cross border cases requires urgent consideration.
2.3 The continuation of the collective redress saga
The New deal for consumers is obviously not the end of the collective redress saga
in the EU, but rather a new departure. According to its 2018 Justice Programme, the
Commission might shortly launch ‘a study on access to justice in mass harm situ-
ations’ following-up on the 2018 evaluation report.79 In addition, a draft resolution
accompanying a European Parliament’s own initiative report on the 2017 EU Justice
74Rothstein/Willging [11].
75Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on representative actions for the
protection of the collective interests of consumers, and repealing Directive 2009/22/EC, COM(2018)184/3,
Art. 16.
76Idem, Recital 9.
77Opinion of Advocate General Bobek in Case C-498/16 Schrems v Facebook Ireland Ltd, 14 November
2016, EU:C:2017:863, para. 123.
782013 Communication on collective redress, pp. 13–14.
79EU Commission, Implementing Decision concerning the adoption of the work programme for 2018 and
the financing for the implementation of the Justice Programme, 19 December 2017, at pp. 19–20, available
at www.ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/other_eu_prog/justice/wp/justice-awp-2018_en.pdf.
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Scoreboard recently requested the Commission ‘to consider collective redress proce-
dures in next year’s comparative exercise on accessibility factors of justice systems,
as it is increasingly significant for facilitating access to justice and efficient dispute
resolution’.80 In parallel, several evolutions can be expected in the coming months.
In particular, privacy and data protection are fields where significant changes are
awaited. The EU General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR) that will take
effect in May 201881—and in particular its Article 80—have already started to trig-
ger some policy discussions at Member States level. In France for instance, privacy
class actions can today not be used to obtain compensatory relief and the mechanism
is only possible to request the cessation of a violation.82 However, the French Parlia-
ment, which is currently strengthening privacy laws in order to bring France into line
with the GDPR,83 will very likely adopt an amendment giving plaintiffs the possibil-
ity to also claim compensation for violations of data protection and privacy rules.84
In England where the Data Protection Bill is currently debated by Parliament, several
civil society organisations including Which?, Privacy International, or Open Rights
Group, have written to the Minister of State for Digital claiming that ‘it is time for
the Government to do the right thing by amending the Data Protection Bill and facil-
itating the implementation of an effective system for collective redress’.85 They took
the view that ‘implementing Article 80(2) of the GDPR would create a collective re-
dress regime for breaches of data protection law. This would complement the existing
collective redress regime introduced under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (. . . )’.86
Finally, some changes could also be expected in the field of human rights. In April
2017, the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights encouraged the adoption of collective
redress mechanisms to facilitate remedies for victims of human rights violations.87
As the Agency highlighted, ‘the EU should provide stronger incentives to Member
80EU Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft report on the 2017 EU Justice Scoreboard,
2018/2019(INI), 6 February 2018.
81Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.
82Biard/Amaro [4], p. 9.
83Projet de loi relatif à la protection des données personnelles, JUSC1732261L, 13 De-
cember 2017, available at www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichLoiPreparation.do;jsessionid=
2685BD989BE8B61EBCD95903A9F80A47.tplgfr41s_2?idDocument=JORFDOLE000036195293&
type=general&typeLoi=proj&legislature=15.
84Amendment CL262 of 23 January 2018, www.assemblee-nationale.fr/15/amendements/0490/CION_
LOIS/CL262.asp. See also for discussions before the Senate, S. Joissains, Rapport no. 350 relatif à la pro-
tection des données personnelles, 14 March 2018 (pp. 127–133), www.senat.fr/rap/l17-350/l17-350.html.
85Open Rights Group, ‘Letter to the Minister of State for Digital: give us the right to defend the
elderly and children’s privacy’, 22 November 2017, available at www.openrightsgroup.org/ourwork/
correspondence/letter-to-the-minister-of-state-for-digital:-give-us-the-right-to-defend-the-elderly-and-
children%E2%80%99s-privacy.
86Idem.
87EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, ‘Improving access to remedy in the area of business and hu-
man rights at the EU level’, Opinion of 10 April 2017 available at www.fra.europa.eu/en/opinion/2017/
business-human-rights.
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States to provide for effective collective redress in cases of business-related human
rights abuse’.88
Discussions on collective redress have recently accelerated with the publication of
the evaluation report of January and the presentation of the New deal for consumers in
April 2018. Yet debates are far from being over. The proposal will now be discussed
by the European Parliament and the Council and will, undoubtedly, be subject to
heated discussions among stakeholders and Member States. On several aspects, the
draft Directive introducing new measures for collective redress is an improvement
compared the 2013 Recommendation. Yet several important issues still need clari-
fications. The New deal for consumers may therefore be a rainbow in the gloomy
collective redress sky, but new rain showers cannot be excluded.
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